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Some Queslions of Inlernalional Law.
SOME QUESTIONS OF INTERNATIONAL

THE RUSSO-JAPANESE

3 75

LAW ARISING FROM

WAR.

II.
The Hay Note and Chinese Neutrality.
By AMOS S. HERSHEY,
Associate Professor of European History and Politics, Indiana University.

T

HE
important
which have
the Russo-Japanese
thusmost
far arisen
out ofquestions

War have been connected with the great
problem of maintaining the neutrality and the
integrity or "administrative entity"' of the
Chinese Empire. In order to preserve the
integrity and neutrality of China proper, as
well as to restrict the area of hostilities as
much as possible, Secretary Hay, acting, it
is said, at the suggestion of Germany, sent
the following instructions to our representatives at St. Petersburg, Tokio, and Peking on
February tenth:
"You will express to the Minister for
Foreign Affairs the earnest desire of the
Government of the United States that in the
course of the military operations which have
arisen between Russia and Japan, the neutrality of China and in all practicable ways
her administrative entity shall be respected
by both parties, and that the area of hostilities shall be localized and limited as much as
possible, so that undue excitement and disturbance of the Chinese people may be prevented, and the least possible loss to the
commerce and peaceful intercourse of the
world may be occasioned."
At the same time all the Powers interested
in the fate of China were informed of this
action on the part of our Government and
invited to take similar action on their part.
The phrase "administrative entity" is said

by some to be ambiguous. It is not really so,
for it must mean the integrity of that portion

of the Chinese Empire which is actually administered or governed by Chinese officials. It at
least includes China proper, i. e., the 18 provinces
south of the Great Wall and east of Thibet, and
probably Mongolia. Manchuria and Korea are of

course excluded-

The favorable replies which were received
from all the Powers would seem to indicate
that similar action was taken by them, and
the principles embodied in the Hay Note
were also accepted by China, Russia and
Japan. China at once issued a proclamation
of neutrality; but the acceptance of the belligerents, more especially of Russia, was,
made conditional upon the acceptance of certain provisos which may lead to troublesome
complications in the future. In its reply of
February nineteenth, the Russian Government signified its willingness to respect the
neutrality of China on the following conditions: (i) That China herself "strictly observe all the duties of neutrality"; (2) that
the Japanese Government "loyally observe"
not only the "engagements entered into
with the Powers," but also "the principles
generally rcognized by the law of nations";
and (3) that "neutralization be in no case
extended to Manchuria." Japan on the other
hand, in her reply of February thirteenth,
merely stipulated that the "region occupied
by Russia" be excluded from the neutral
area, and that "Russia, making a similar engagement, fulfil in good faith the conditions
and terms of such engagement." 2
It will thus be seen that both Russia and
Japan have made their acceptance of the main
principle of the Hay Note, viz., the maintenance of the neutrality of China proper,
conditional upon its observance by the other
belligerent. This is entirely reasonable and
proper; but Russia has, in addition, stipulated for a strict observance of the duties of
2 For
the texts of these replies, see World's
Work for April, 1904.
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neutrality on the part of China and of the law
of nations on the part of Japan. Inasmuch as
numerous disputes regarding neutral rights
and obligations as between neutrals and belligerents, as also charges and countercharges of violations of the law of nations between the belligerents themselves, are bound
to arise in every war, and inasmuch as each
party is its own judge in these matters, it is
not difficult to see that we have before us a
task of no small magnitude and one which
contains possibilities of endless complication
and controversy. Pretexts in infinite number
and variety will not be wanting, especially to
Russia, if she desires to avoid the natural
consequences of her engagement.1 Not only
must the conduct of both belligerents be
closely scrutinized, but that of China must
also be carefully watched.
The term "neutrality," as applied to China
by the Hay Note, appears to have a double
meaning. In the first place it means that
China is to be "neutralized" during the
struggle, i. e., she is not to be permitted to
become a party to the war. This might perhaps be called a temporary, as opposed to the
permanent neutralization of Belgium and
Switzerland.
It is neutralization under a
sort of international guarantee of the Powers, although less formal and perhaps less
effective than that of Belgium and Switzerland, which was the result of great international treaties. It may, however, prove to
be a step in the direction of permanent neutralization. If such guarantees are to prove
wholly successful, the guarantors must, of
course, be ready and willing to resort to
other means than those of "moral suasion"
or "pressure of public opinion" in case of
necessity. Whether the Powers are prepared
to resort to the use of force in case of such
necessity in the present instance remains to
The Hay Note is also bound to give rise to

important questions of policy and diplomacy; but

this is not the place to consider them.

be seen. The "temporary neutralization" of
China might also be compared with other
modern tendencies to restrict or "localize"
hostilities as mtch as possible in the interest
of the possible or actual belligerents or of
neutral commerce, e. g., the practice of
pacific blockade and other forms of reprisal,
although here the difference is one of kind
rather than of degree.
In the second place the maintenance of
Chinese neutrality, as implied in the Hay
Note, means that hostilities or hostile preparations must not be carried on within the
territorial limits of China proper, i. e., in
those parts of China administered by Chinese officials. This is, in a sense, merely a
guarantee of a right already in existence,
vi-., of the undoubted right of China to remain neutral, if she so desires, and to have
her territorial sovereignty respected during
the struggle by both belligerents. The violation of this right by either belligerent
would be a gross violation of International
Law in itself which it might be the duty of
China to resist by force of arms; and, in case
China herself were incapable of such an effort, such an attack might be resisted by any
State which chose to champion her cause, although such knight-errantry is rare among
nations except where their national interests
are involved. The right of the Powers to
take such measures as may be necessary in
order to prevent or to defeat an attack upon
the neutrality of China is clear and unquestionable.
It seems to be clearly understood on all
sides that Manchuria, or that portion of the
Chinese Empire which is administered, in
accordance with treaty stipulations, by Russian officials for certain purposes and is actually occupied by Russian troops, shall be
exempt from the application of the principle,
of the Hay Note. This appears to be a case
of what has been called "double or ambigu-
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ous sovereignty." 1 In such cases the territories or districts in question owe a nominal
allegiance to one sovereign, but are really
subject to the commands of another who is in
actual possession. It is possible for such a
place or region to possess a belligerent and
a neutral character at the same time--belligerent in respect to the belligerents and neutrals, and neutral in respect to the nominal
sovereign and his relations with other
States. "The precise legal position of these
territories, is very difficult, and perhaps im'
possible, to determine." One modern publicist, who has carefully examined the question, has come to the conclusion that "a juristic examination of these relations can only
lead to negative results; it is a political provisional arrangement in which law and fact are
in contradiction to each other." 3
The law which should govern in all such
anomalous cases is, however, reasonably
clear. "The belligerency or neutrality of territory subject to a double sovereignty must be
determined for external purposes, upon the
analogy of territory under military occupation, by the belligerent or neutral character
of the State de facto exercising permanent
military control within it. .

.

. When a place

is militarily occupied by an enemy, the fact
that it is under his control, and that he consequently can use it for the purposes of his
war, outweighs all considerations founded
on the bare legal ownership of the soil. In
like manner, but with stronger reason, where
sovereignty is double or ambiguous a belligerent must be permitted to fix his attention
upon the crude fact of the exercise of power.
He must be allowed to deal his enemy blows
wherever he finds him in actual military posOther examples of double or ambiguous
sovereignty are Bosnia, Herzogovina, Cyprus,
and Egypt. These territories or districts are
under the nominal sovereignty of the Sultan of
Turkey, but are really administered by Austrian
and English officials.
Hall, Treatise, note on p. 569 of 3d ed.
Holzendorf, Handbuch, II., § 51-quoted by
Hall in note cited above.
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session, unless that possession has been
given him for a specific purpose, such as that
of securing internal tranquiliity, which does
not carry with it a right to use the territory
for his military objects. On the other hand,
where a scintilla of sovereignty is possessed
by a belligerent State over territory where
it has no real control, an enemy of the State,
still fixing his attention on facts, must respect the neutrality with which the territory
is practically invested."'
In view -of the anomalous position of China
in respect to, Manchuria, and also because
of the vast interests involved and the great
danger to the peace of the world which might
result from any violation of Chinese neutrality (whether by either or both belligerents or by China herself), it is not surprising that the Press of all countries (and particularly of our own) has shown itself very
sensitive to any charges of a violation of
the neutrality of China (especially by Russia), and that much has been said by way of
criticism and denunciation which is either
unjust or impolitic.
Several weeks after the outbreak of the
war, Admiral Alexieff issued a somewhat
quaint and curious proclamation to 'he inhabitants of Manchuria, of which there has
been much unfair criticism. This manifesto,
which contained "six regulations which all
must tremblingly obey" (after charging the
Japanese with treachery in covertly attacking the Russian fleet while peaceful negotiations were in 'progress) lays especial stress
upon the indissoluble unity of Russian and
Chinese interests. He expresses the opinion
that "on the principle of mutual connection
between the cart-prop and the cart, the duty
of China should be to join in attacking and
destroying the invader wherever he is encountered;" but, "since China has announced
her resolve to remain neutral and to look on
with her hands in her sleeves," Admiral AlexHall, op. cit., p. 511.
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ieff contents himself with ordering "every
(Chinese?) official in Manchuria" to render
the Russian army every possible assistance
in obtaining supplies, and in directing all
the inhabitants of Manchuria to treat the
Russian troops with confidence. He declares
that he will hold "all virtuous citizens residing in the neighborhood of Manchurian railways or telegraph or telephone wires responsible for their protection," and that "the official headmen and village elders must unanimously devise means to prevent damage.
Should attempts at destruction be
only will the offenders be severely
not
made,
punished, but the officials and people of the
vicinity who witnessed such attempts will be
held responsible." He also threatens severe
punishment against any one privily harboring or concealing the Chunchuses or redbearded brigands of Manchuria. He finally
threatens that "if officials or people treat with
enmity the Russian army, the Russian Government will assuredly exterminate these
persons, showing no mercy."'
While the language of this proclamation
is certainly somewhat harsh and the penalties
prescribed rather severe, they do not seem
to go beyond the rights of an invader or a
military occupant, nor do they constitute a
violation of Chinese neutrality. As has been
noted above, Manchuria is not included within the sphere of Chinese neutrality as far as
the belligerents in their relations with each
other and with neutrals are concerned.1 The
position of Manchuria is one of double or
ambiguous sovereignty which is closely analogous to that of a territory or district under
military or belligerent occupation. 3 Under
I For the text of this curious and interesting

proclamation, see the London Times (weekly ed.)
for February 26, 1904.

It is neutral in respect to the relations between China and other States.
3 On the subject of Military or Belligerent Occupation, see especially Hall, Pt. III., c. 4; Lawrence, Pt. III., c. 4; Halleck, II., pp. 444ff; Bfluntschli, Arts. 539-41; Calvo, §§ 2166-98.

such circumstances pillage or mere plunder
is strictly forbidden and private property on
land is not subject to capture and confiscation; but the invader or military occupant
has an undoubted right to levy and collect
fines, requisitions, and contributions for
strictly military purposes, and he may, if he
chooses, make the war support itself. These
should, however, be as orderly and as light
as possible, and they should not exceed the
needs of the troop or the resources of the
district in which they are levied. Above all,
it should never be forgotten that the fundamental law of warfare is that of reasonable
military necessity, and that only so much violence is permitted in war as is necessary
for self-protection and the destruction of the
The fact
enemy's power of resistance.
that the Russians expect the Chinese in
Manchuria to treat them in a friendly or nonhostile manner, or even that they require
them to furnish their army with supplies and
carts for purposes of transportation, is no
evidence of an intention or a desire to violate
Chinese neutrality, as some of our newspapers seem to have regarded it, nor is it a
breach of the laws of civilized warfare.
It is said that the Russian minister at
Peking has made firm representations to the
Chinese Government concerning the activity
of the Chinese troops along the Manchurian
frontier; that Russia has served notice on
China that the latter must not send troops
beyond the Great Wall; and that China has
been informed that she must use her influence to restrain the Chinese bandits (who are
spoken of as partially under the control of
Chinese officials) from interfering with the
railway and telegraph lines. It is also stated
that Russia has notified China that a refusal
to heed these warnings will be considered a
breach of Chinese neutrality, and that China
has received a pointed intimation of the defensive measures which Russia may in that
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case be compelled to take for her own protection. 1
The dispatch of Chinese troops to the
Manchuria frontier is not necessarily a menace to Russia, inasmuch as it may have for
its object the perfectly legitimate one of
protecting the neutral rights of China against
possible or probable encroachment. On the
other hand the massing of such troops in this
quarter in large numbers might, under certain circumstances, be regarded as menacing
in its character. In no case could it be regarded as a direct violation of Chinese neutrality. The request that China use her
influence to restrain the Chinese bandits
in Manchuria as far as possible seems to be
a perfectly ;proper one to make it itself, although, to be sure, it would be absurd for
Russia to claim that China can be held responsible for any degree or amount of lawlessness and violence on the part of any
portion of the population in Manchuria, or for
the attacks of Chinese bandits in that region.
Dispatches from St. Petersburg further
declare that Russia has demanded the dismissal of the Japanese military instructors
with the Chinese army. Russia's protest on
this head would seem to be eminently reasonable and proper and is said to have been
tacitly approved by the United States Government.
It is also said that Russia believes or stispects that China has been giving secret aid
to the Japanese fleets by allowing them to
coal and re-victual in Chinese harbors. So
far as our information extends, these
charges have been very vague and nonspecific in their character and particular instances have not been cited. If China has
permitted any of her ports to be used as a
constant and regular base of supplies,
whether of coal or of provisions, to the JapThese representations are supposed to have
been made in March of this year. In the absence
of official documents, we have been forced to rely
upon doubtful or possibly exaggerated newspaper
reports.
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anese fleet, she would undoubtedly render
herself liable in damages for any injury which
might result to Russia. The neutrality regulations of most States, particularly of the
United States, are very stringent and explicit
with regard to coal. Our Proclamation of
Neutrality, issued by President Roosevelt on
February eleventh, provides that "No ship,
of war or privateer of either belligerent shall
be permitted, while in any port, harbor,
roadstead, or waters within the jurisdiction
of the United States to take in any supplies
,except provisions and such other things as
may be requisite for the subsistence of her
crew, and except so much coal only as may
be sufficient to carry such vessel, if without
any sail power, to the nearest port of her
own country; or in case the vessel is rigged
to go under sail, and may also be propelled
by steam power, then with half the quantity
of coal which she would be entitled to receive, if dependent upon steam alone, and no
coal shall be again supplied to any such ship,
of war or privateer in the same or any other
port, harbor, roadstead, or waters of the
United States without special permission,
until after the expiration of three months
from the time when such coal may have been
last supplied to her within the waters of the
United States, unless such ship of war or
privateer shall, since last thus supplied, have
entered a port of the Government to which
she belongs." But it should be borne in mind
that the peculiar or particular stringency of
our own municipal decrees or regulations regarding our neutral obligations are by no
means to be taken as a necessary measure
or standard of what is permitted or forbidden
by International Law.
There have also been complaints on the
part of the Japanese of the sinking of a Jap,anese coasting steamer near Tain Chin
Island, presumably in Chinese waters, and
there is said to have been considerable irritation in Japan over the inability of the Chinese
Government to compel a Russian gunboat
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to leave Shanghai, as also of their inability
or unwillingness to drive the Russians from
the region on the west side of the Liao
river.' W'e are not sufficiently informed as
to the facts in order to pass judgment upon
all of these charges, but the sinking of a vessel in Chinese waters by either belligerent
would be a gross violation of Chinese neutrality for which ample apology or reparation should at once have been made. The
refusal of a Russian war vessel to leave a
Chinese port at the request of the Chinese
Government would be wholly unwarranted
and would constitute a serious breach of
Chinese neutrality. But these are questions
which, even assuming the facts to be as reported, might easily be settled without a resort to arms. As to the inability of the
Chinese to secure the evacuation by Russia
of the region west of the Liao river, or to
protect that region from a possible Japanese
invasion, these are points which require a
closer examination and a fuller discussion.
There has been a considerable newspaper
controversy in respect to the neutrality of
that portion of Manchuria which lies west
of the Liao river, and of the treaty-port of
Niu-Chwang, an important strategic point
east of the Liao river and one of the tcrinini
of the Northern China Railway system. It is
in this region that China's neutrality has been
"subjected to the severest strain and to the
closest scrutiny and criticism," as a recent
writer in the Contemporary Review 2 predicted
would be the case. This region, like the rest
of Manchuria, was fully occupied by Russia
in consequence of the Boxer uprising in
19oo.' On April 8, 1902, Russia agreed to
a gradual evacuation of Manchuria within
The Russians on their side have suspected

China of a willingness to aid the Japanese to

land .in this region.
2 See article
on "The Neutrality of China" by
D. C. Boulger in the Contemporary Review for
April, 1904.
3 This region had, however, been practically,
though not definitely, under Russian control since

eighteen months, and of this particular region within six months, although she reserved to herself the right to guard the
Russian railways. According to this treaty,
Russia agreed to the "redstablishment of
Chinese authority in Manchuria," which was
to remain "an integral part of the Chinese
Empire," and also consented to "restore to
China the right to exercise sovereign and
administrative powers." 4 This arrangement,
however, never seems to have been fully carried out, owing, as Count Cassini says, 5 to
the "failure of China to furnish the required
guarantees."
China claims that this region is neutral and
has included it in her declaration of neutrality. Russia has, however, declined to respect its neutrality, and has gone so far as
to proclaim martial law at Niu-Chwang.
She has re-occupied (?)7 this district and has
forbidden China to station troops within its
borders. Yet, on the other hand, she has
shown a disposition to hold China responsible for the preservation of order in this
territory and is said to have intimated that
1898, when China leased Port Arthur and the
Bay of Ta-lien to Russia, and at the same time

granted her a railway concession through Manchuria from Siberia, including the right to garrison and govern the territory along the line. A

similar railway concession in Northern Manchuria had been obtained by Russia as early as
1896.
4 Art. I. of the treaty.
See Current History
(XII., pp.

292ff)

for June,

1902.

s See article on "Russia in the Far East" by
Count Cassini in North American Review for May,
1904.
6 A portion of the Russian army seems, indeed, to have been withdrawn, but the remainder
were simply stationed at important places along

the Manchurian railways. The Northern Chinese

railway to Niu-Chwang was restored to China.

In September, 1903, Russia undertook to restore
Niu-Chwang and to evacuate Mukden on Oct.
8, 1903, but this never seems to have been done:
for, on Dec. 28, 1904, the Russian Minister at
Peking informed the Chinese Foreign Office that
"no further steps towards evacuation can be
undertaken at present." See Statesman's Year
Book for 1904, p. 516.
I The question mark indicates a doubt as to
whether it had ever been really and wholly

evacuated.
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a landing of Japanese troops on its coas
would constitute a violation of Chinese neutrality for which China would be held responsible.
A great outcry was raised by the American Press in consequence of the proclamation of martial law at Niu-Chwang on March
twenty-seventh. This outcry was probably
aggravated by the indiscreet action of the
Russian police authorities in ordering some
American (and British) flags on certain private buildings at Niu-Chwang to be hauled
down. The Russian authorities seem to have
been clearly within their rights in this matter, but they wisely apologized for this action and the flags were restored to their
former places upon the representations of ihe
American consul.' It was also reported that
the foreign consuls at Niu-Chwang were
notified that they were no longer to exercise consular jurisdiction and consular functions, especially those of extra-territorial
jurisdiction, but this report does not seem
to have been confirmed. It seems that certain of their functions, especially those comprehended under the term "extra-territoriality" were merely suspended, and that the
foreign consuls are still permitted to exercise such of their duties as are compatible
with the execution of martial law. We do
not recall that it has been customary to deprive consuls of their ordinary duties in time
of war, but it could hardly be expected that
they should be permitted to perform such
service as would be inconsistent with the
operation of military law.
In declaring martial law at Niu-Chwang,
as also in occupying the region west of the
Liao river with troops, Russia was clearly
acting within her rights and was guilty of no
violation of neutral rights or of the neutrality of China. This region forms a part of
There seems to have been no protest at
Washington. Of course if the flag had been removed from the official residence of the consul,
the case would have been different. A prompt
and ample apology would have been necessary.
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Manchuria which was at least impliedly excepted from the application of the Hay Note,
and has been practically in the possession or
under the control of Russia since i9oo..
When Russia chose to "re-occupy" this region with troops and to declare martial law
in the early part of the present struggle, all
doubts as to its neutrality vanished and it
became a part of the field of possible military
operations for Japan as well as for Russia;
for it would be absurd for Russia to make
belligerent use of this territory while claiming any part of it as neutral in respect to
Japan.'
In conclusion, it may said that at the present date of writing,' there have been no.
serious or well-authenticated cases of the
violation of Chinese neutrality, whether on
the part of either belligerent or of China herself, which would necessitate the intervention
of the Powers or would justify either belligerent in attacking China. Even if such violations have occurred or should occur on the
part of China, they ought to be treated with
great leniency, especially by Russia, on account of the serious difficulties of China's
position and because of her military and
administrative weakness. For this weakness
and these difficulties Russia is in large measure responsible. Any violation of Chineseneutrality on the part of either belligerent,
short of actual invasion of Chinese territory,
should be settled by diplomacy or arbitration.4
2 Russia
seems to have made such claims in
respect to the sea-coast.
May 4, 1904.
Since the above was written Niu-Chwang
appears to have been practically abandoned by
the Russians, although it does not, at the present date of writing (May 2o, 1904), seem as yet
to have been occupied by Japanese troops. It
will be interesting to notice the policy which the
Japanese shall adopt in respect to the neutrality
of Niu-Chwang and the region west of the Liao
river.
A curious and interesting story has come via
London from Peking to the effect that the Russian ministers at S6ul and Peking have been trying to induce China to "take over" Niu-Chwang-
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The purpose of such a proposal on the part of
Russia (and we are inclined to credit the story
because such methods are highly characteristic of
Russian diplomacy), is, of course, obvious. It is
intended to embarrass Japan in her future .relaBut, apart
tions with China and the Powers.
from any question as to the ultimate disposition
of this territory, Japan could not thus be deprived of her right to the use of this region for
military purposes. See editorial in N. Y. Times
for May 15th.
There has also been a report, emanating from
St. Petersburg, to the effect that the Chinese
have tacitly agreed to co6perate with the operations of the Japanese against Russia. The Japanese propose, it is said, to drive General Kuropatkin's forces into Mongolia. This, it is urged,
would place the Russians in the position of in

WON

vaders of Chinese or neutral territory, and would
enable General Ma's army to make reprisals,
thus cleverly avoiding the infringement of Chinese neutrality by Japan or China. See N. Y.
Times for May 16th.
If Russian troops should be driven into Chinese territory, a well-known and indisputable rule
of International Law requires that they be
interned and kept there at Russia's expense until
the close of the war or until exchanged. China
has again recently given repeated assurances of
her intention to observe all her neutral obligations toward both belligerents. For the recent
attacks of Chinese bandits in Manchuria on Russian outposts and coal mines, China can in no
wise be held responsible unless they have been
inspired or encouraged by the Chinese government.
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By Guy H.

HOLLIDAY,

Of the Boston Bar.

Twhere
was inthe
the juries
early were
days ofapttheto Southwest
be more
familiar with Spanish than with English.
The case against the prisoner was strong.
There was upon the evidence, offered by the
district attorney, not a shadow of a doubt
that the defendant had stolen the horse, and
the cross-examination by his counsel had not
helped matters in the least. In spite of all
this, however, and the fact that horse-stealing in that region was more serious than
murder or robbery, the defendant's counsel,
who was something of a student of human
nature, as well as learned in the law, managed to win his case. As soon as he had
learned from his client the weakness of the
defense, he had sought out a Spanish speaking friend and had learned from him four
words of Spanish,-"Gentlemen of the jury."
He had practised on these until his accent
was irreproachable. Then, when the time
came for the argument, he arose deliberately

and turning to the jury spoke those four
words; all the Spanish he knew.
In an instant, the district attorney was on
his feet, objecting to the use of Spanish in

the argument, that English was the official
language of this country, that such an innovation was without precedent, and a great
deal more to the same effect. But the defendant's counsel waxed indignant also, and
in the most urgent manner showed to the
court that this case was of vital importance
to the prisoner, that an argument to the jury
lost half its force when filtered through an
interpreter. Again and again, he shouted
that it was the right, not only of the accused,
but of the jury to have the argument made
in a language that they could understand.
Finally, as he had expected, the court decided against him, and the argument was
finished in English. As he had also expected, however, the jury, though unable to
understand English well, had got the idea
into their heads that he had wanted to address them in Spanish and had not been allowed to do so, and also got the notion that
they themselves had in this way suffered a
slight, and accordingly, with a fine disregard
for the evidence, promptly gave their verdict
in favor of the prisoner.

